

Fourth Year Thesis Titles and Abstracts—April 2005

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A Critical Review of the Development Critiques

The virtual failure of development over the past half-century has given rise to a number of incisive critiques. While economists have maintained that they simply need better models and data to discover the keys to development, Marxian critiques have castigated such mainstream approaches, accusing them of simply concealing the underlying power relations that are the real cause of poverty. Three recent critiques of development transcend the limits of this stagnant debate, offering fresh perspectives that specify how development can be improved. The first critique focuses on the discourse of development; the second investigates the epistemological basis of development projects; and the third questions the methodology economists utilize to understand economic development. Though these critiques address different aspects of development, they agree on the importance of local knowledge and participation for the success of development. In this thesis, I present and criticize the more recent critiques. I synthesize the main criticisms and outline an argument for basing development projects around local knowledge and experience.

The first critique, which I draw from James Ferguson's *Anti-Politics Machine*, centers on the discourse of development. Ferguson investigates the conceptualization and implementation of one rural development project in Lesotho. He argues that the development agencies works within a discourse that reconstitutes Lesotho as a stagnant, untouched agricultural economy, despite its vibrant market-oriented history. Development agencies also tend to exclude local conditions and practices from informing development projects. Their re-constitution of Lesotho creates an image of the country that is conducive to the technocratic, apolitical development interventions they specialize in. Given the ignorance of local practices, themselves rooted in a historical political struggle, the agencies draw up a project utterly inappropriate for rural Lesotho, and the scheme fails.

I draw the second critique, which focuses on the epistemological basis of *ujamaa* villagization in Tanzania, from James Scott's *Seeing Like a State*. Scott argues that an unwavering faith to high-modernist ideology underpins large-scale interventions like *ujamaa*. Followers of this ideology, like Tanzania's leader during *ujamaa*, uncritically adopt techniques associated with modern technical progress without regard for local conditions. For example, during *ujamaa* the government mandated large-scale monocropping despite the fact that small-scale polycropping suited the region better. High modernist ideology also privileges epistemic knowledge over all other forms of knowing. Scott makes a powerful argument linking the dedication to episteme, abstracted knowledge that is universal, to the denigration of *mētis*, experiential

knowledge that is localized. In his view, people who run development projects must acknowledge and incorporate local, contextualized knowledge in order to create successful projects.

The final critique looks at methodology. In it, I summarize Milton Friedman's justification for formalism in economic methodology and review literature demonstrating that theories of economic growth have not performed well. I then present the work of three economists who argue that this poor track record stems from economists' commitment to uncovering economic "laws." This commitment assumes that laws exist in the social world and that people can discover them. The economists I draw from question the appropriateness of these assumptions. Their arguments suggest that scholars should start studying economic processes on a local level to gain a better understanding of economic development.

Each critique I summarize sheds light on a different facet of development. However, they all locate a central problem in the strive for universal models, imposed top-down, which do not take into account context and belittle local experience and knowledge. In the final chapter, I synthesize these critiques, showing how they converge on the idea that local knowledge is crucial for development. I then evaluate the World Bank's responses to these critiques, highlighting the lack of change in the Bank's operating methods. My argument goes beyond suggesting that development agencies simply need to hire more consultants. While such a move would undoubtedly help, it is not enough. For development to be meaningful and effective, the entire process of conceptualization and implementation must be reoriented to align with local goals and incorporate local knowledge. Instead of assuming they know best, developers must draw on the resources of the people they are trying to help.

Lucy M. Alford

Out of Silence: Poetry and the Politics of Recognition

This paper highlights a need for human recognition in responses to the political crises that have shaped contemporary international history. Tracing this theme from the political work of Kant through the contemporary debates on human rights, I explore different ways scholars have sought to interpret and integrate this project in terms of political justice, and some of the challenges and arguments they have faced along the way. In the work of Immanuel Kant, a conception of political ethics emerges that places individual wellbeing and human interaction at the heart of civil and state priorities. Recent writers continue to draw from Kantian notions of universal dignity and self-determination. Rights advocates such as Martha Nussbaum, Henry Shue, and Jonathan Glover have sought to address the challenges of creating a politics that combats the pervasive divisions, massive neglect and dehumanizing atrocities – the failures of human recognition – that have marred our recent past.

The power of the human voice emerges as a central force in the project of recognition. With its heightened attention to the singular lives at stake in political dilemmas, human rights theory works toward a vision of representative and participatory politics inclusive of the diverse voices of any people. Voices and the stories they contain have played primary roles throughout movements for liberation and civil equality throughout history. The practices of contemporary NGO's such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch concentrate and direct the transformative potential of public testimony.

Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss the work of a series of poets, each writing from a context of violent political conflict. Responding to the conditions of Poland during and in the wake of World War II, Czeslaw Milosz gives voice to the moral outrage and confusion of the Holocaust. Seamus Heaney sheds light on his native Northern Ireland's deeply divided society, and calls attention to the layered history complicating Ireland's internal Troubles. A third case explores the situation of apartheid in South Africa's recent past through the work of Ingrid de Kok. Like Heaney, de Kok rejects the violent dualism that tore her nation apart. Korean poet and immigrant Theresa Hak Kyung Cha speaks of political homelessness, and the layers of painful history ingrained in the stories of her family and her nation. Cha and de Kok both point to the unique position of women in political transitions and in questions of human rights.

Each of these writers confronts silence and the limitations of language. Each articulates the moral uncertainty imbedded in the position of witness, and in the role of the poet. Yet in the line of Kant, each recognizes the experiences that distinguish and the ties that bind individual human lives, and the moral dilemmas that pervade human relations. Their work encourages an approach to current political contexts that recognizes the wounds of the past while pressing toward a transformed future.

Patrick Douglas Bradshaw

The Necessity of the Bear: An Examination of Russia's Role in the Anti-Terrorist Coalition

September 11, 2001 marked a turning point in relations between Russia and the United States. Despite past friction between the two countries, Russian President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to call President George W. Bush, offering support to the United States after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. In this thesis, I analyze Russia's role in the anti-terrorist coalition in terms of what Russia hopes to gain from participation, the assets it has to offer to the coalition, and a promising vehicle of cooperation in the form of NATO, all in the context of the US-Russian relationship.

In the first chapter, I examine what Russia hopes to accomplish in joining the coalition by looking at Russia's own experience with terrorism in the Caucasus. I focus on Chechnya as the most illustrative challenge to Russian security. Viewing the conflict from a historical perspective, I identify Russian interests in the region, explaining why Russia continues its anti-terrorist operations. Before 9/11, President Putin was largely unsuccessful in his attempts to link the conflict in Chechnya to international terrorism, receiving a great deal of criticism from the West over Russian methods of anti-terrorist operations in the region. After pledging Russian support for the US following 9/11, however, much of this criticism from high-level US officials ceased.

Identifying the Taliban regime as harboring the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, the US focused its attention on Afghanistan as the first stage in its anti-terrorist response. In the second chapter, I look at what Russia has to offer the coalition, using its significant influence in central Asia as an asset to the United States. In addition to negotiating the use of airspace and military bases in the central Asian countries, Russia offers its experience from a ten-year war in Afghanistan by engaging in intelligence sharing and other support to the US.

In the third chapter, I argue that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization offers a promising vehicle of cooperation for the United States and Russia. In the period since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO evolved from a regional security organization into a force willing to work out of its traditional area to address new areas of instability affecting its members, including the threat of terrorism. Despite Russian concerns over the threat of NATO expansion, Russia-NATO collaboration, especially in the area of anti-terrorism, has increased dramatically. I also examine limits to cooperation, in light of the US trend to work unilaterally or bilaterally in attempting to accomplish its objectives.

I evaluate Russian-US cooperation on anti-terrorism in terms of what has been achieved and what further needs to be accomplished. I identify two areas of potential improvement, arguing that both sides must strive to avoid civilian casualties in their anti-terrorist operations and that a long-term development strategy, pursued in tandem to anti-terrorist operations, will address the roots of the problem. The killing of non-combatants only exacerbates the situation, and anti-terrorist operations focused on identifying and eliminating terrorists only provide a short-term solution. Finally, I argue that successful collaboration between the United States and Russia in the realm of anti-terrorism will encourage future cooperation.

Samuel Hayim Brody

A Covenant of Peace: Pragmatism, Utopia, and an Alternative Moral History of Brit Shalom

Brit Shalom (the name literally means “Covenant of Peace”) was a marginal group of socialist religious Zionists active in Palestine from 1925-1933. It took Jewish-Arab relations as its primary focus, considering the achievement of an agreement with the Palestinian Arabs to be a moral and political necessity for the realization of Zionism. It usually receives passing or dismissive mentions in histories of Zionism. I argue that despite the historical fact of its marginality, as evidenced by its lack of numbers and failure to enact its program, the group deserves to play a larger role in present-day memories and histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

I begin by taking issue with the term “bi-nationalists” as a designation for the members of Brit Shalom and its various successor groups, such as the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and the Ichud (Unity). The term refers to a formula for a solution to which many members of these groups subscribed; however, its use obscures the background and uniqueness of their thought. In order to provide context for my argument, I begin by examining the Zionism of Martin Buber (1878-1965), a philosopher who significantly influenced many of the core members of Brit Shalom, and who was a member himself although he did not move to Palestine until 1938. I present Buber’s thought as having emerged from the intellectual cross-currents of Central Europe in the early twentieth century, and discuss his career as a mainstream Zionist politician before his early retreat to the margins. Finally, I discuss “the line of demarcation,” Buber’s characteristic political notion. Buber rejected *Realpolitik* as offensive to God and the ethical command, but he also rejected the idealist refusal to participate in politics at all. He argued for a middle way in which each person adheres to the command to better society by entering into politics and

engaging it to the limits of justice in any particular situation. He then sought to apply this notion to nationalism and Zionism.

Having established the contours and context of Buber's Zionism, I go on to ask whether there was any hope for this set of European ideas to be able to impact the reality in Palestine. Brit Shalom is faulted by critics for having failed to acquire Arab interlocutors; I therefore devote significant space to examining the intellectual and political context for Palestinian Arab politics during the British Mandate period. I argue that it is possible to separate what Sidney Tarrow and others have called the "frames of contention" used by social movements from the grievances on behalf of which they advocate, by looking at the way that the frames change as they interact with changing social settings. Here, this means examining the contingent evolution of the Arab nationalist frames from the late Ottoman through the British periods, and detaching these frames from the material issues of Zionist immigration, land purchases, economic segregation, and the struggle for sovereignty. In the following chapter, following a somewhat parallel structure, I describe the evolution of three distinct Zionist frames and the changing settings in Palestine that affected their level of influence and success. Then, I describe the attitudes of these three streams of Zionism on those issues which were previously identified as primary material grievances for the Palestinians, and compare their stances. The end result is that Brit Shalom, despite its unique and alien combination of intellectual influences, reached a position that was the closest of all the Zionists to being able to answer Palestinian complaints. I argue that we should therefore be less quick to attribute the failure of Brit Shalom to naïveté or an unbridgeable gap between Zionist and Arab positions.

In the final part of my discussion, I characterize the present as the scene of a continuing competition between the two prophecies of Vladimir Jabotinsky and Martin Buber on the future of Zionism. I present a selection of alarmist discourse from Israel today from a number of sources as evidence that some of the most basic issues surrounding the existence and structure of the State of Israel are still often treated as open to question. I argue that this uncertainty about the state of Zionism is a vindication of Buber's prophecy. I then ask how we might make use of the memory of Brit Shalom today, and present three binary oppositions which Brit Shalom either transcended or united in their thought. My conclusion is that the tense and open state of discourse on Zionism today calls for mining the past and re-introducing previously forgotten elements. Such remembering can help point to the path of peace through life in a climate that often seems to offer no hope.

Laura Lucille Fairneny

Reaping What We Sow: An Analysis of the Effect of Federal Regulation on the Plant Biotechnology Industry in the United States

From the time the first genetically modified foods were commercialized in the mid-1990s to the present, American companies and farmers have dominated the plant biotechnology industry. The United States is home to the world's leading biotechnology company, a St. Louis based firm called Monsanto, and grows approximately two-thirds of the world's genetically modified crops. Furthermore, while a storm of controversy has developed across the globe regarding the effect of genetically modified foods on human

health and the environment, American consumers seem relatively complacent about the whole issue compared to the rest of the world, and as a result, the acres of genetically modified foods cultivated from 1996 to 2003 in the United States increased 27-fold.

I contend that much of these trends can be attributed to the lax regulatory framework that the federal government adopted in 1986 under President Reagan. Obsessed with leading the world in biotechnology, the Reagan administration published the “Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Products of Biotechnology.” According to this document, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were to regulate the products of biotechnology but were not to treat the process of genetic modification any differently than traditional breeding methods. This philosophy and regulatory structure still exists today.

However, while lenient regulation succeeded in getting the biotechnology industry on its feet in the 20th century, I argue that it will not sustain the industry into the future. On the contrary, effective regulation is necessary for the continued success of genetically modified foods in the United States. Three case studies are considered to prove this point.

First, I examine the persistent problem of moderately low consumer approval of genetically modified foods, which limits the ability of the biotechnology industry to grow and diversify. However, by requiring all products that may contain genetically modified foods to bear FDA-approved safety labels, the FDA may be able to succeed where the biotechnology industry has not.

Second, I look at the problem of gene escape from genetically modified organisms to their wild relatives. While the biotechnology industry has developed a solution to this problem called the terminator gene, the industry’s previous attempt to use this technology was seen as a threat to the poor farmers of the developing world. The resultant international backlash compelled the biotechnology industry to abandon the terminator gene. However, if APHIS were to require that this technology be used in American commercial crops of genetically modified plants, then Americans could reap the benefits of this technology without placing the blame on the biotechnology industry.

Finally, I examine the possibility of insect resistance to *Bt* toxin, which threatens to eliminate the continued use of this environmentally-friendly pesticide. Though the EPA already sets requirements to slow the development of resistance, it does not enforce them. This lack of enforcement puts the sustainable use of *Bt* toxin into jeopardy.

Gregory Mosteller Garrett, Jr.

The Bleeding Hyperpuissance: America, the Neoconservatives, and a Democratic Iraq

Although it has become cliché to refer to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, as a watershed for America, few events in the history of the United States have engendered such a profound shift in the thinking and desires of an American president as those which transpired on that fateful day. Foreign policy, hitherto insignificant for a president initially fixated on tax cuts and education reform, became of paramount importance, not by choice but out of necessity. Throughout the metamorphosis that ensued, the neoconservatives, a group of individuals sprinkled throughout President George W. Bush’s

administration and around him in various Washington, D.C. think tanks, rose to prominence within the President's war cabinet and gained national publicity for both their influence on the president and their bellicose rhetoric toward "hostile regimes."

Despite what the press tends to portray, neoconservatism is far from a coherent "movement" of intellectuals, and the end of the Cold War has only exacerbated the differences between various neocons, many of whom have split along largely generational lines over the proper justification for American intervention. However, from the earliest neocons, such as Irving Kristol, Daniel Bell, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, up to the younger individuals who have gained notoriety of late, including Bill Kristol, Robert Kagan, and Richard Perle, two persistent themes bind all of the neoconservatives together. First, they tend to view America's foreign policy dilemmas as Manichean struggles between good and evil, in which the neocons and America, as the defenders of virtue, are locked in an existential battle against a diametrically opposed, ideological enemy. Second, although they pay lip service to the efficacy of soft power, their rhetoric betrays a myopic emphasis on the utility of force as a transformative agent of change. Underlying their thinking is the conviction that ideas really matter and have substantial consequences in the world.

Drawing upon these two themes, the younger generation of neocons has taken up the mantle of "exporting democracy," oftentimes as an end in and of itself. However, as I show, their overly simplistic, binary worldview and their predilection for force doom their venture to failure. Confident in the ability of American military might to effect change, the neocons carelessly advocate unilateral interventions overseas to perpetuate their messianic mission, irrespective of what the international community thinks. As I argue, this leads to a lack of legitimacy for their actions, which, in turn, erodes America's moral authority in the global community, thereby leaving the United States to fend for itself in the arduous and immensely complicated task of nation-building. Without the crucial support of the United Nations and America's traditional allies in the liberal democratic community, most notably in Europe, the United States suffers from a lack of the requisite institutional support and knowledge that have been critical to past nation-building projects. Additionally, America is left alone to shoulder the tremendous economic and human costs that are part and parcel of exporting democracy.

Now entering its third year, Operation Iraqi Freedom, a largely unilateral invasion that the Bush administration undertook over the vehement opposition of both its traditional allies and the international as a whole, provides an ideal crucible in which to test the neocons' prescription for spreading democracy overseas and defeating what they have labeled the existential threat of our age, Islamist extremism. As the disastrous imbroglio in which America currently finds itself attests, the neocons' proposition is fundamentally untenable, because American might cannot substitute for the material support and legitimacy that come with the imprimatur of the UN and our allies in Europe.

Phillip Martin Gover

Reforming the Indian Trust: An Analysis of the United States' Indian Land Policies from the General Allotment Act to the Present

I argue that the normative policy assumptions underlying the allotment policy have led to the government's present and historic failure to manage the Indian money and lands it holds in trust for tribes and individual Indians. I begin by defining the government's trust responsibility as the fiduciary responsibility to properly manage the lands and monies of individual Indians and tribes the government currently holds in trust as a result of the failed allotment policy.

My research shows that from the formation of allotment policy, culminating the General Allotment Act in 1887, the attitudes of the reformers that shaped the policy were best characterized as misguided and ignorant benevolence on one hand allied with insatiable greed for Indian land on the other. This research leads me to conclude that allotment policy was doomed from the beginning. I go on to show that in the end, the greed for Indian land won over the misguided benevolence of the reformers as westerners took over Indian policy. By 1910 the original allotment law was completely unrecognizable as a mechanism for promoting Indian self-sufficiency and instead became an efficient engine of Indian land pulverization. The actual results of allotment were nothing like what the benevolent reformers dreamed. While the original goal of allotment policy was to create productive yeoman-farmer citizens out of Indians, its ultimate effect created landless paupers largely dependent on the federal government. The result of this failed policy was the permanent trusteeship of government over Indians.

From here I demonstrate that as a direct result of the legacies of allotment policy, the government's efforts to manage the fiduciary trust of its Indian beneficiaries were also doomed to failure. Complicating fulfillment of the responsibility was a combination of long-term mismanagement by the BIA and Congressional neglect do anything to fix major problems despite early opportunities to do so. By the time belated Congressional attempts at reform were mandated decades later, the system was hopelessly broken. In a last-resort effort to force the government to account for its failures and reconcile the trust system, a class action lawsuit sought relief from the federal courts. I contend that despite the best efforts of the judge to alert the Interior and the Bureau to their serious long-term breach of trust, judicial reform efforts met a brick wall of institutional resistance and inability to comply because of historic mismanagement. Today, while Congress searches for settlement of the case, the trust responsibility goes unfulfilled.

I conclude that the failures of allotment policy have so tainted the institution of the BIA and the Interior that in order to fulfill its fiduciary trust responsibilities, Congress must take immediate steps to drastically reorganize the Bureau by creating a separate Department of Indian Affairs to manage the Indian trust. I argue this based on two main findings in my research: first that long-term institutional failure on all levels in the Interior and in the Bureau prevents either from being able to institute reform and second that part of the reason the system is so broken is that it was based on the flawed normative policy assumptions embodied in allotment. Reform, I resolve, begins by pulling up the roots of allotment policy that taint the institution. The abolishment of the BIA and the establishment of a new Indian bureaucracy founded on concepts of self-determination and dedicated to fulfilling the trust responsibility is the only way to truly reform the Indian trust.

Reema Hijazi

The Ways to Peace, or the Way to Peaces: the Competing Ideologies of the Israelis Peace Camp

This thesis is an attempt to give meaning to the notion of peace by way of considering how that notion shapes movements for coexistence within Israeli society. I contend that there are two facets of the Israeli peace camp, the liberal left and the critical left, which formally fell away from each other in 2000. They did so because they were not united in the notion of peace they sought. The two groups wanted an end to conflict, but defined that end in different ways, expected different results from that end, and approached it using different methods. While variation in a movement cannot be avoided, and indeed benefits the movement by broadening its resources, the variations within the Israeli peace movement converged around two poles, one seeking peace in separation, the other in cooperation. Traveling in different directions toward their own notions of peace, these two groups lost their unity of purpose and so undertook different paths to different peaces.

To accomplish this end, I trace the shape of the two competing ideologies of the Israeli peace camp that caused the groups to diverge. These ideologies cannot be reduced to conceptions of nationalism, though they include nationalisms. The ideologies are the people's views of their place in the world, and what that place means for how they interact with others. In order to place these ideologies in the context of Jewish Israeli efforts toward peace, I employ the Hebrew word for peace, shalom. I term the ideology of the liberal left separation shalom, and that of the critical left cooperative shalom.

The two conceptions of shalom structure the way these two groups operate: how they engage in processes for peace, cooperate (or do not cooperate) with Palestinians, define Zionism, and identify themselves in relation to that Zionism. The first part of this study is dedicated to exploring how the liberal Israeli left circumscribes its conception of shalom, and method for attaining shalom, within a Jewish Israeli framework. They intimately connect their shalom with the idea of nationalism as a bounded group of people who share something in common, in this case, Jewish identity that comes from a shared Jewish history. The second section describes the new methods of the critical left, which demonstrate that they conceptualize shalom within a framework of cooperation and inclusiveness. This group's nationalism conceptualizes a community based on the people living within its physical boundaries. These people may have differing interests that correlate to their own collective ethnic groupings, but the shared sense of place overrules such divisions and demands equal sharing of that place.

This study of new directions in a more inclusive peace camp is ultimately a commentary on ideological marginalization. I conclude not by determining which conceptualization and approach to peace is more effective or genuine, but how the different conceptualizations of peace grew from the critical left's displacement within Israeli society. These activists participate in cooperative peace due to the marginal ideological position from which they begin, and their participation in that peace serves to further marginalize them.

Aaron Miles Kurman

Assessing Blame: Analyzing the Failure of Camp David II and the Israeli-Palestinian Permanent Status Negotiations, 1999-2001

In this thesis, I examine the history of the permanent status negotiations that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak conducted with Palestinian President Yasir Arafat between September 1999 and January 2001 in light of the debate that has arisen as to why these two ill-fated leaders, with the mediation of U.S. President Bill Clinton, failed to conclude a permanent status peace agreement. I assess why the negotiations, which climaxed at an American-sponsored summit at Camp David in July of 2000, failed and how that failure was connected to the initial outbreak and escalation of the second *intifada* in the fall of 2000.

Even while still at Camp David, Ehud Barak was beginning to devise a strategy for explaining the summit's failure by blaming Arafat for rejecting a generous Israeli offer. Barak's narrative of the failure of the Camp David summit became the foundation of the orthodox explanation of why the permanent status negotiations failed – because Arafat was unable or unwilling to make the strategic decisions necessary to end the conflict. A year after the Camp David summit, Robert Malley, who had served on the National Security Council and as Clinton's Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs during the permanent status negotiations, and Hussein Agha, a scholar who had advised Palestinian negotiators during the Oslo peace process, sought to debunk the orthodox explanation by offering a revisionist interpretation of Arafat's behavior at Camp David and by spreading the responsibility for the failure of the Camp David summit – and the permanent status negotiations – among all three sides.

In my first chapter, I analyze the orthodox-revisionist debate between Dennis Ross, who served as the U.S. Envoy to the Middle East under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and Agha and Malley. Their debate centers around the question of blame: Ross thinks that Arafat demonstrated his inability to end the conflict and thus blames Arafat for the failure of the negotiations; Agha and Malley think that Arafat's behavior can only be understood within its historical context and that the failure of the negotiations was due not to one man's intrinsic character but to the cumulative actions and decisions of each of the three parties to the negotiation.

In my second chapter, I analyze other revisionist arguments that assign the blame for the failure of the Camp David summit and the permanent status negotiations to Israel and/or the United States. Like Agha and Malley, the revisionist commentators I examine disagree with Ross's claim that Arafat was the reason the permanent status negotiations failed. Unlike Agha and Malley, they play the historical blame game by asserting that Israeli and/or American policies, actions, and decisions were most responsible for the failure of the permanent status negotiations.

In my third chapter, I return to the debate between Dennis Ross and Hussein Agha and Robert Malley in order to study the last two months of the permanent status negotiations between Barak and Arafat. Ross and Agha and Malley agree that by January 2001, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators could envision the terms of a fair and final permanent status agreement. They disagree on what these terms were, at what point in time the negotiators could envision them, and on why the two sides ultimately could not reach agreement.

I conclude by arguing that the blame game played by Israeli and Palestinian leaders during the permanent status negotiations and throughout the peace process ultimately paralyzed the permanent status negotiations and made it much more difficult for Barak and Arafat to make the final compromises that were necessary to complete a permanent status agreement. By blaming each other for the failures of the peace process, Israeli and Palestinian leaders often did not take responsibility for their own actions or consider how their actions hurt the other side and undermined the other side's faith in the possibility of achieving its core political needs through negotiations. In the end, the blame game became a self-fulfilling prophecy: Barak and Arafat discredited each other as peace partners in the eyes of their publics and were unable to make peace. I finish by offering several suggestions for how Israeli and Palestinian leaders, with the mediation of the United States, might be able to avoid the blame game in future permanent status negotiations and give themselves a better chance of succeeding.

Patrick Lane

Sing a New Song: Religion's Potential to Change American Politics

The study of religion and politics has become more complex over the past fifteen years, as scholars have "rediscovered" religion's influence on political behavior in a more nuanced and detailed way than ever before. In the first chapter of this thesis I review the literature on religion and political behavior, which, despite varying methods and models, agrees that religious commitment and orthodoxy are indeed important to political variables such as ideology, party identification and vote choice. Studies show that religion's import over the past generation has become increasingly conservative and pro-Republican. The "religiosity divide" has emerged as one of the most important cleavages between the Republican and Democratic Parties.

But "religious" has not always automatically connoted "conservative" in American politics. Radical Quaker and evangelical abolitionists, Progressive religious thinkers and activists like Walter Rauschenbusch and Dorothy Day, and civil rights preachers such as Martin Luther King, Jr., are enough to prove this point. The origins of the contemporary religiosity divide lie in the cultural liberalism of the 1960s and especially in the Christian Right movement, which was built in reaction to this liberalism. For more than two decades the Christian Right has dominated the public role of religion in the United States. In Chapter 2 I explore the origins and development of this movement and the "religiosity divide" that it brought about.

In Chapter 3 I assess the role of religion in the 2004 election, which offered a snapshot of where both major parties stood last year with regard to religious communities. President George W. Bush had long been recognized by the Christian Right as one of their own, and Christian Right leaders and activists were chomping at the bits to reelect him. Meanwhile, early Democratic frontrunner Howard Dean was openly secular, until a botched attempt to "find religion" that backfired and helped end his candidacy. Sen. John Kerry, emerging as the Democratic nominee, was initially quiet about his Catholic faith. The Democrats made late but substantial efforts at religious outreach and religious rhetoric, but in the face of Christian Right dominance these efforts were too little, too late to win over the targeted demographics of "centrist" Catholics and evangelicals.

Progressive religious leaders and activists were “reawakened” in 2004, and since then they have begun to direct their time and energy toward movement-building for the long run. In Chapter 4, I present some explanations for the religious left’s relative obscurity during the past thirty years, and then report on what this community is currently doing to reassert itself in American public life in a new and more vital way. The potential is there for a new progressive faith movement to rival the strength of the Christian Right, and the prospects are exciting, but it will be a multi-year, uphill battle against obstacles both external and internal. The potential assets of this nascent movement include already-existing congregation-based community organizations that together count millions of members, and especially the teachings of religion itself. In my epilogue, I address the concerns that arise from a further mixing of religion and politics.

Jeffrey Lenowitz

Justice, Fairness... Wealth Maximization? Questioning the Moral Justification for Richard Posner’s Normative Law & Economic Theory

I argue that, despite his best effort, Richard Posner fails to justify the principle of wealth maximization, which serves as the centerpiece to his normative law & economic theory. Briefly stated, the principle of wealth-maximization directs the courts to maximize wealth by mimicking the market when it fails and allocating goods and rights to the parties that value them most. Wealth is defined as the sum total of all goods and services weighted by their values, and value is measured by looking at how much a person or party is willing to pay for the good in question. Replicating the market in this fashion involves coercive transfers, the creation of uncompensated losers, and the making of legal decisions based upon nothing more than the financial situation of a party. This principle, opposed to both ethical theories of various sorts and our commonsense moral intuitions, continues to have a profound impact on the way legal dilemmas are solved today. Evaluating the principle of wealth-maximization is therefore of the utmost importance, for the law increasingly effects us all.

Posner claims that wealth-maximization should serve as the normative first principle of the courts, i.e. that courts should rule with the primary intent of maximizing wealth, and gives three justifications for such a principle. First, Posner argues that wealth is *the* social good, and that maximization is therefore a moral imperative. This argument fails, for wealth is an instrumental good and it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that when compared to all other normative principles, solely focusing on maximizing wealth will lead to the most or best mix of intrinsic goods. Moreover, Posner rejects the most obvious instrumentalist defense of wealth-maximization, utilitarianism. He argues that wealth-maximization maintains the positive aspects of utilitarianism, avoids the latter’s flaws, and reconciles autonomy and equality concerns. However, upon review, none of these claims seem true.

Second, Posner claims that wealth-maximization operates on the basis of consent, and therefore the libertarian emphasis on autonomy justifies the principle. This argument fails for numerous technical reasons; all of which stem from a basic contradiction between the libertarian and wealth-maximization rationales. Libertarians want to preserve autonomy above all else, and emphasize the importance of consensual market transfers—the type of exchange that relies solely on willing behavior—accordingly.

Quite oppositely, the wealth-maximization principle is designed to coercively force transactions, in the event of market failure, in order to maximize wealth. Therefore, wealth-maximization and autonomy concerns inevitably conflict, and the libertarian justification for wealth-maximization not only fails, but is inherently contradictory.

Third, Posner appeals to an argument from hypothetical consent, claiming that the principle of wealth-maximization is justified because individuals, if given the chance, would consent to its recommended distributions and decisions. This argument founders because of what seems like confusion on Posner's part. While the fact that a person consented to a rule is a reason in itself for enforcing the rule, a similar reason is not created just because a person would have consented. Therefore, Posner's attempted justification of wealth-maximization with counterfactual consent relies upon some alternate source of external value that would somehow motivate individuals to maximize wealth. Posner never explains what such a concept would be, but reasonable possibilities such as fairness, utility, wealth, and self-interest, fail to provide the needed justification.

As I show, the principle of wealth-maximization is a normative principle that has the potential to affect the lives of many, but is without any source of justification for doing so. For this reason, wealth-maximization, at least of the Posnerian variety, must be the subject of continual analysis and skepticism.

Stephanie Irene Maximous

The Politics of Fertility: Women's Bodies as Battleground for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

According to the UNRWA, birth rates in the Palestinian Occupied Territories are among the highest globally. The West Bank and Gaza are already quite densely populated and some might say overcrowded, with over 3 million inhabitants, and that figure is expected to rise to 5.5 million by 2014. In Gaza, where fertility rates are some of the highest in the world, women have an average of seven children, which is about four times the average in the United States.

An examination of the general political situation in the Israel/Palestine region as it relates to women and their reproductive decisions is crucial. The Palestinian case presents a seeming paradox of expectation and reality: there is a constellation of factors in place that would indicate for declining birth rates; however fertility remains high. The political conflict is effectively the variable in play that explains the unfulfilled expectation, since the conflict infiltrates and bears upon all aspects of social life, even in the private sphere. There are several elements to this complex problem, from how it is an extension of the socio-cultural history of the region to the interaction with the political conflict to the public health ramifications as well as the root structural causes of the problem. In order to gain a more multi-dimensional understanding of the issue, stories of many women in the Occupied Territories are presented in order to demonstrate the complexity of pronatalism and the wide range of opinions on the current situation of uniquely high fertility in the region.

By introducing arguments in favor of expanding women's capabilities, I provide an examination of the capabilities and rights that might be compromised given the refugee women's perceived obligations to

the family, community, and future of Palestine. The sources of pressure urging high fertility and projecting these obligations are neatly integrated into the socio-political woodwork of the society and in many cases have been imbibed by the women giving birth. By analyzing these bodies of force—namely the influence of history, the lure of incentives, the impact of politics, and the function of religion—in light of theories of coercion, it will be possible to conclude whether or not women are making free and independent choices. I next explore the extent of coercion or exploitation attained by pronatalist policies and their subsequent impact on and interest to a variety of agents, from individuals to global interest-holders. Finally, arguments in defense of the nationalist cause are juxtaposed against the call in favor of protecting individual capabilities, followed by an appeal to justice for the stakeholders involved.

The purpose of this thesis is to tease out the demographic dynamic in the region, specifically in the Occupied Territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It is an understatement to simply state that the political debate is heavily shrouded in biased language, yet it is imperative to recognize that the population balance between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs has also been absorbed into the convoluted and highly rhetorical discourse. The points brought up are part and parcel of a broader issue related to the tenuous interaction between population and politics as well as the perennial clash of institutions and people, as well as the community and individuals. This paper examines the political tension through the lens of population study and demographic assessment. The status of women and the viability of their rights and capabilities as counterbalanced by the exploitative and potentially coercive pressures placed on them by external forces is the crucial factor on which the Palestinian claim to mandate and justify pronatalist efforts hinge.

Brandon Possin

Together is Better: The Need for Public Goods to Restrain Competitive Consumption

The past two decades have seen unprecedented material prosperity in the United States. Yet people continue to feel pressures to consume as never before. Consuming desires are complex, but social incentives comprise a growing part of those individual desires. Clearly, individuals are not consuming for the use value of goods as much as those goods' social exchange value. What drives much purchasing behavior is the need to spend whatever it takes to emulate a chosen reference group. Competitive consumption is what I call this socially-influenced type of consuming.

Influencing pressures to consume competitively, I argue, is the lack of public goods, specifically those public goods/services that can complement private goods (such as transportation, education, playgrounds, libraries). Private goods have excludable benefits that rank their users on a consumption hierarchy—positionality. People seek position through ownership of goods and services. Public goods, however, tend to enable less positionality than private goods because public goods are frequently non-rival goods and available to all. The reason that more private goods fail to satisfy in the era of excess is because consumptive satisfaction is relative to the social context. The positionality enabled by consuming private goods creates social externalities which have deleterious impacts on well-being. Besides creating

positionality concerns, the presence of competitive consumption erodes support for public goods, and fewer public goods lead to more competitive consumption.

To understand how public goods influence the relationship between consumption and well-being, I first look at the intensifying social meaning of goods themselves. I then consider psychological and social motivations to consume and how structures of the political economy influence practices of competitive consumption. While psychological and compensatory offensive motivations to consume do exist, I notice a defensive aspect to a majority of consuming decisions. Money does not buy happiness as much as money prevents unhappiness. For many reasons, public goods prevent the social externalities of private consumption. As a case study, I examine the relationship between the presence of competitive consumption and politics, social structure, democratic values, cultural norms regarding consumption, religion, and support for public goods in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. I then critique the dominant “invisible hand” ideology, arguing that individual self-interest and market incentives do not lead to optimal consuming patterns in affluent societies. I finish with recommendations of how to best change today’s flawed consumption practices. I incorporate previous arguments, relate animal evolution to flawed consumption patterns, recognize the social irrationality of competitive consumption, and argue against the sustainability of current consumptive trends.

Limiting expenditures on positional goods will increase the well-being of all. Competitive individualistic advance through consumption no longer serves individuals or society as a whole. The best way to limit expenditures on positional goods is for a community to consume collectively to a greater extent. Together is better.

Mythili Rao

A Reader’s Guide to the Life of Ashwin Upadhyaya

I began this project with an alphabetized list of twenty-five Sanskrit terms collected from a variety of texts on Hinduism. I then transposed these terms onto the life of a fictional Indian-American protagonist (Ashwin Upadhyaya) through a series of one- to three- page vignettes interspersed through this character’s life. The stories start when Ashwin is two years old and end when he is seventy-nine.

The stories are not intended to be parables or illustrative definitions of the concepts I selected. Instead, they are creative explorations of the way ancient ideas may weave into a modern life. In the accompanying essay, I discuss some of the key factors relevant to writers of Indian descent (subject matter, use of language, selection and use of genre, and choice of ethnic identification), reviewing critical discussions of the work of such major writers as V. S. Naipaul, Salman Rushdie, Arundhati Roy, and Jhumpa Lahiri to inform my own attempt at fiction.

Jonathan Leserman Robbins

Predictable, Not Paradoxical: Using the Concept of Structural Violence to Understand the Rapid and Extensive Spread of HIV in Botswana

The rapid transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in Botswana has been a source of puzzlement for the international HIV/AIDS community. Unlike its politically and economically volatile neighbors, the economy of Botswana has grown at breakneck speed since the early 1970s, while at the same time institutions of liberal democracy took root and flourished. Botswana quickly became a rare 'success story' of sub-Saharan Africa, a shining paradigm of stable and prosperous post-colonial development. Revenue from the lucrative diamond industry has been used to expand the national economy beyond the traditional activities of cattle ranching and arable farming. A shrewd cadre of politicians ensured that the fruits of the mining industry were distributed throughout the nation.

The first AIDS case was reported in Botswana in 1985; twenty years later, nationwide HIV prevalence among 15-49 year-olds is a staggering 37%. In a country with a double-digit growth rate during the 1970s and 1980s and a record of free and fair elections since independence in 1966, the spread of HIV appears to be a paradox: How could a country that did *so well* in its economic and political development do *so poorly* with regard to HIV/AIDS?

The concept of structural violence provides a useful framework with which to appraise the HIV pandemic in Botswana. Fundamental to a theory of structural violence is the belief that individual agency can be constrained and curtailed by imbedded societal injustices and inequities.

An examination of Botswana's colonial history and political economy unearths such injustices. With the implementation of indirect, or soft, colonialism over the Bechuanaland Territory and the imposition of a hut tax, rural Botswana were forced to seek wage-work in South African mines or on European-owned farms. Labor migration is endemic in Botswana, which has been called "a nation on the move." Recent economic development in Botswana has been driven by the mining industry, while few structural improvements have been made in the rural economy.

Labor migration allowed for the rapid spread of tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Migrant laborers transported disease from high-concentration urban areas to rural villages. The pattern of spread of HIV mirrors these historical epidemics.

To effectively address the root causes of the HIV pandemic in Botswana, the national government must implement structural prevention programs. The provision of subsidized anti-retroviral treatment has been central to the government's response. Because anti-retroviral treatment does not address rural poverty and labor migration (which have been central to the spread of HIV), the government response to HIV prevention has been insufficient. Substantive changes must be made in the rural economy, including the creation of wage employment and an increase in rural wage rates. International organizations have an important role to play in the push for rural development in Botswana.

Leah Beth Rosenberg

What is a “Reasonable Parent”? Exploring the Ethical, Cultural, and Psychological Complexities of Pediatric Medical Decision Making

Based in my experiences as a social work intern at a Virginia Beach pediatric hospice, my thesis explores the complexities of parental medical decision making. I begin with a narrative about a young leukemia patient, Emily, whose case involved a series of hard choices for her parents. I visited Emily on a weekly basis during the summer of 2003 and witnessed her parents' difficulties acknowledging her medical realities following a third relapse of her cancer. The decisions and dilemmas of Emily's parents form the basis for a set of ethical questions about her care. From these questions, I consider parental decision making for seriously ill children with respect to complicating moral, cultural, and psychological factors. While the mainstream bioethical framework considers choosing for children in terms of surrogate decision making grounded in the autonomy principle, I conclude that clinician obligations to parents and pediatric patients should be expanded to include active promotion of parental beneficence. I want to call the appropriateness of this framework as it applies to children into question and complicate the view of a parent as a strictly rational or even reasonable decision maker.

The framework for parental decision making put forth in Tom Beauchamp's and James Childress' *Principles of Biomedical Ethics* draws upon the Western philosophical tradition and synthesizes diverse strands of religious as well as secular thought. Beauchamp's and Childress' view of parental deliberators emphasizes the promotion of parental autonomy and the creation of a reasonable parent who utilizes his or her cognitive faculties to make an appropriate decision. Their positions seem to be clearly informed by the socio-cultural history of relations between parents and children in the West. In the second and third sections, I discuss the ways in which culture and emotion affect parental decision making. Anthropologist Arthur Kleinman describes a distinction between the codified, principle-based world of the ethical and the experiential, multifaceted world of the moral. These two categories both have specific forms of knowledge and epistemologies. The standard denies the reality of parental deliberators in favor of a rational, appropriate model that is detached from both culture and emotional reasoning.

Physicians should support the parents of their patients and encourage the exercise of not only their autonomy but also their beneficence. As a guiding hand and a compassionate ear, the physician has a unique role to play. Closer communication and collaboration between physicians and the parents of seriously ill children will bring about positive changes for both parties. When medicine and bioethics come to accept the moral world as a valid source of knowledge, the frustrated search for a reasonable parent may give way to a more empathetic pursuit to support the caregiver and patient.

Angela Rose Schutte

Constructing and Reconstructing Social Communication: A Model for Understanding Advertising as a Social Structure and its Implications for Promoting Transformative Social Action

I argue that in contemporary consumer society, advertising has become a dominant social structure through which individuals construct their identities and communicate meaning. Although the concept of “social structure” plays a fundamental role in social science discourse, only vague definitional consensus has ever been formed over the term. Therefore, I develop a definition of social structure by drawing on three main models of social structure: Marx’s base-superstructure model, William Sewell’s schema-resource model, Anthony Giddens’s systems of social relationships-systems of meaning model. From these, I extract three dualities that function within social structure and describe the dialectical relationship between individuals and social structure. First, social structure is both virtual and material; it has no material existence in itself, but affects social life in concrete ways and is embodied in individuals. Second, social structure enables and constrains human agency; it limits the possibilities for action while creating a framework through which individuals can function. Third, social structure is both stable and changing; the interaction between individuals and social structure continually forms and reforms each element, which creates constant potential for change, even though the dynamic remains relatively stable over time.

Using these dualities as a foundation, I describe how contemporary branded advertising creates a mutually sustaining and relatively stable bond with individuals. It functions as a social structure by creating a framework for human interaction and producing meaning in society. Branded advertising emerged during the Industrial Revolution as a means for manufacturers to differentiate their virtually indistinguishable products by attaching images and symbolic meaning to them. In the subsequent years, advertising has developed a complex system of brands that work together as a symbolic language. Individuals act as agents within the system of advertising, continually making decisions about how to appropriate the symbolic meaning of brands in order to communicate. I argue that because contemporary consumers have grown up in advertising and understand how it works, individuals neither reflect nor blindly reproduce branding’s symbolic vocabulary. Rather, individuals produce advertising’s structure by embodying it in ways that reproduce and transform it.

Individuals have agency within social structures and the capacity to transform them. Therefore, I argue that individuals have the capacity to utilize advertising’s structure in radical and transformative ways. Because contemporary consumers better understand how branding functions (brand = product + meaning), they can more successfully wield branding in order to create new meanings and disrupt existing ones. This mindset has spawned the technique “culture jamming” which uses the structure and language of advertising in order to talk back to brands. Because corporations spend so much time and money creating effective brands, hacking into that system in order to create new meanings is a powerful and accessible form of communication. Culture jamming creates meaning from within advertising—it both uses and challenges advertising’s sign system—which allows it to disseminate alternative ideas and identities through a means that already permeates social life. By infiltrating branded meaning, culture jammers

transform advertising's structure. Although advertising companies have made a number of attempts at neutralizing culture jamming by commodifying it (moving it away from radicalism into the mainstream), culture jamming already exists within the system and gains its communicative power from this position, which makes it more difficult to disarm. In fact, culture jamming garners by engaging in constant dialogue with advertising.

Jeffrey M. Tebbs

Redefining "Access": A Preliminary Evaluation of the University of Virginia's New Financial Aid Initiative

Significant disparities in attendance by students from high- and low-income families have persistently plagued colleges and universities nationwide, even those selective institutions practicing "need-blind" admissions. In February 2004, the University of Virginia garnered national attention by implementing "AccessUVA," a new financial aid paradigm that replaces all need-based loans with grants for families below 200 percent of the poverty line. The program also caps the total value of loans issued to individual students at 25% of the four-year cost of attendance. Work-study requirements are waived for all students demonstrating financial need. This thesis evaluates the efficacy of the \$18 million per year investment in AccessUVA.

The spectacular rise in the wage premium for college graduates and the declining real value of the high school diploma indicate that upward mobility is increasingly determined by educational opportunity. In chapter one, I review the key barriers to access faced by low-income students considering application to elite universities. I find that a story of credit-constraints plausibly explains the low enrollment rates of a significant segment of the low-income population. This explanation proves less salient for selective institutions, where resources for financial aid programs are far more substantial. Low-income students may also systematically misperceive the potential costs and benefits of attending an elite institution. The lack of evidence supporting federally means-tested aid, in conjunction with the mounting evidence demonstrating strong effects for more transparent aid programs, indicates the viability of this interpretation. Concomitantly, Carneiro and Heckman provide strong evidence on the role of gaps in academic achievement across income classes. The chasm in standardized test scores between high- and low-income youth is sizeable and factors heavily in the under-representation of low-income students at selective institutions. The relative weight of these two latter causal modalities is difficult to determine.

In chapter two, I investigate whether schools with a higher fraction of poor students exhibit disproportionate increases in applications in the first year of AccessUVA (Spring 2005). While I find a general increase in applications across all quartiles, I do not find a disproportionate gain for schools with a higher proportion of low-income youth. This analysis is conducted at the high school level, utilizing a single year of post-policy data, with the sample restricted to Virginia public high schools.

In chapter three, I explore the joint evolution of AccessUVA and the "Charter Initiative." I review the impetus for Charter, including the Commonwealth's erratic historical commitment toward funding higher education. Declining state General Fund support, in conjunction with mid-range tuition levels, explains the

collapse of faculty salaries relative to peer institutions. In examining the structural political forces, I conclude that the level of state appropriations is unlikely to rise appreciably. I review the components of charter and conclude that the charter initiative is necessary for the long-term health of the institution, in spite of the drawbacks associated with a “high-tuition / high-aid” model.

In general, the evidence presented points toward the desirability of obtaining and analyzing individual-level application and matriculation data on an on-going basis. Should AccessUVA fail to deliver the desired result in the long-term, it appears that employing a “dynamic concept of merit” (i.e., an admissions preference for low-income students) offers a viable strategy for boosting socioeconomic diversity at the University of Virginia.